










































Abstract: The paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the natural resource curse,
which postulates a negative link between natural resource abundance and economic
growth. It shows empirically that resource-rich countries appear to have a less devel-
oped financial system and investigates a potential mechanism behind this connection
by applying insights from the finance and trade literature. It tests whether the re-
source sectors’ lower demand for short-term external credit negatively affects financial
development. This is done with cross-sectional and panel analysis, using an instrument
for credit demand based on exogenous geographic determinants. The results, however,
suggest that poor economic diversity rather than firms’ credit demand drives the detri-
mental effect of resources on finance.
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1 Introduction
The observation that resource-based economies experienced rather low growth rates in
the last 60 years compared to other nations suggests that resources might be a curse
rather than a blessing. Various explanations for this phenomenon have been proposed:
for example, harmful exchange rate effects, exposure to conflicts or a weak institu-
tional framework. This paper investigates whether financial systems are less developed
in resource-abundant economies due to lower external credit demand, assuming an
indirect effect on growth.
The following discussion builds on the literature’s finding that finance is an impor-
tant determinant of growth. In order to evaluate the effect of natural resources on
welfare, it is crucial to explore a potential financial channel. I find a significant nega-
tive link between resource abundance, in particular resource dominance, and financial
development, which confirms previous empirical studies.
The present paper further contributes to the literature by investigating in detail a po-
tential explanation for this negative relationship. Its approach emphasizes the demand-
side effect in the determination of financial markets. It follows the finding that indus-
trial sectors systematically differ in their dependence on the financial sector. Finan-
cially independent firms need less external finance because they can use internal cash
flow for investment instead. In an economy with many financially independent firms,
credit demand may be low, resulting in less need to develop a large financial sector
providing external credit. This consideration is based on the belief that financial de-
velopment is at least partly influenced by the demand for external credit. If resource
sectors were financially independent—as has been suggested by many researchers—
resource-dominated countries would have a less developed financial system as a conse-
quence. Previous work shows that resource sectors rely less on external finance when
the measure of financial dependence refers to short-term liquidity needs.
In order to formally address the problem, the paper applies a model developed in the
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trade and finance literature by Do and Levchenko (2007) that studies the relationship
between financial development and sectoral external dependence in the presence of
international trade.
I follow essentially the same empirical strategy, while adjusting it to the purposes of
the natural resources analysis. An economy’s aggregate (short-term) credit demand is
proxied by the external finance need of exports (abbr. EFNX), where the financial
dependence of a sector is multiplied by its share in the country’s total exports. This
measure thus captures the credit demand that arises from the country’s export struc-
ture. It is used as the main right-hand side variable in the regression equation, while
the dependent variable is a measure of financial development. Estimation is done with
ordinary least squares (OLS) in a cross-section of 93 (110) countries with averages from
1970 to 2007 (1992 to 2007). Control variables include other determinants of financial
development such as income per capita, trade openness and legal origin. In addition,
I estimate a panel specification with both time and country fixed effects in order to
capture omitted variables.
As the literature suggests, financial development (as an endowment) might, in turn,
influence the export structure, which is embodied in the proxy EFNX. In order to
handle this important endogeneity problem, I construct an instrument for the country’s
aggregate credit demand. The actual trade flows are predicted with the help of sector-
level gravity estimations with exogenous geographic determinants of trade such as
distance and land area. Estimations for each sector make it possible to predict the
export pattern rather than just the trade volume. The obtained instrument is used in
a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression.
At first glance, the results appear ambiguous. In the cross-section with both OLS and
2SLS, there is evidence of a resource curse operating via the proposed demand-side
effect in the financial system. In contrast, the panel analysis does not support this
hypothesis, which could be due to omitted variables in the cross-section. Following the
literature on resources, the quality of a country’s institutions may play a role in this
context. Robustness checks, however, show that measures of institutional quality are
unlikely to be an omitted variable. Further analysis suggests that most resource-based
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countries show high export concentration. A poorly diversified economy rather than
low credit demand of resource firms may explain the negative link between resources
and finance.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the resource curse
literature. Section 3 sheds light on a possible financial channel and explains the appli-
cation of the theory in detail. The empirical strategy and data are described in Section
4. The results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Natural Resource Curse
In the last several decades, economists have observed that on average resource-rich
countries, especially many African, Latin American and Arab nations such as Nigeria,
Sierra Leone, Venezuela and Saudi Arabia, tend to grow at slower rates than countries
with few natural resources. While resource abundance was considered unambiguously
positive until World War II, economic literature later started to analyze this “paradox
of plenty” (Karl 1997) more closely. The phenomenon is usually referred to as the
“resource curse” (Auty 1994), where the resources of interest are point resources with
a high concentration in certain regions of the world such as oil, natural gas and mining
products.
A number of empirical studies have tried to validate the resource curse hypothesis,
including the work of Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001), who apply resource exports rela-
tive to gross domestic product (GDP) as a measure of a country’s resource abundance.
These studies, however, have been challenged by recent publications. The measure
of abundance is criticized in particular because output- and trade-related variables
suffer from endogeneity problems. These variables might just represent low economic
diversification, which is a common characteristic of poor countries, and not the actual
resource abundance. Brunnschweiler (2008), for example, proposes alternative mea-
sures such as subsoil wealth per capita, which are more appropriate to capturing the
actual natural resource endowment of an economy. Alexeev and Conrad (2009) point
out that most empirical papers do not consider economic booms in the early years of
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extraction prior to the 1970s, thereby underestimating the role of resource depletion
over time. These authors are more skeptical towards the presence of a resource curse.
Nevertheless, there is still an ongoing and lively debate on the detrimental effect of
resource abundance on a country’s development that is far from reaching consensus.
In order to explain the mechanisms through which the resource curse may operate,
economists have presented a variety of theories. One explanation that has been popular
among researchers is the so-called “Dutch disease,” based on the supposed experience
of the Netherlands after a resource boom in the 1960s. It states that the rents obtained
from resource exports can render a country’s manufacturing sector less competitive by
raising the real exchange rate (see Corden and Neary 1982, van Wijnbergen 1984, Stijns
2003). Another theory suggests that resource abundance might foster armed conflicts
and civil war through the “looting” of resources by rebel groups and “grievances” in lo-
cal communities due to mineral extraction (e.g., Ross 2004). Gylfason (2001) finds that
natural capital deteriorates public and private incentives to accumulate human capital.
Recent work emphasizes that a national economy dominated by resource extraction is
heavily exposed to welfare-decreasing macroeconomic volatility (van der Ploeg 2010).
Yet another explanation that has gained prominence in recent years is that the resource
curse operates through the institutional channel (Mehlum, Moene and Torvik 2006).
On the one hand, differences in the quality of institutions, including the legal and
political system, the rule of law as well as property rights, determine whether resources
are advantageous or disadvantageous for an economy. On the other hand, resource
extraction may, in turn, affect a country’s institutions. Researchers show that both
private agents and politicians tend to engage in rent-seeking in order to benefit from
the available resource income, thereby crowding out profit-oriented entrepreneurship
and fostering corruption among bureaucrats (see, e.g., Tornell and Lane 1999, Sala-i-
Martin and Subramanian 2003). Resource dominance has been associated with a lack
of democracy and a tendency towards autocratic political systems (see, e.g., Ross 2001).
The institutional hypothesis is important because institutions are considered to play
a crucial role for the development of an economy (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
2001). Furthermore, the theory can explain why some resource-rich countries such as
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Australia, Canada, Norway and Botswana have been very successful economically in
recent decades. These countries were able to avoid or overcome the resource curse due
to their strong institutional environment, and they show that resource abundance does
not necessarily lead to lower economic growth.2
Given the importance of the institutional setting, it is surprising that there has been
relatively little research on finance as a possible channel of the resource curse. Indeed,
growth economists have identified financial development as a major determinant of
growth (see, e.g., Levine 2005, Rajan and Zingales 1998).3 Thus, resource abundance
could indirectly affect economic growth through a country’s financial system.
3 The Financial Channel
Do resource-rich economies show less developed financial systems? Figure 1 suggests
that this indeed seems to be the case.4 Countries with a high share of resources in
total exports tend to have a smaller financial sector measured by private credit to
GDP. Section 5.1 shows in more detail that this holds true when controlling for other
determinants of financial development such as real GDP per capita and trade openness.
This is in line with recent papers’ findings (Nili and Rastad 2007, Beck 2011, Kurronen
2012).
3.1 Literature
There are several explanations for this negative relationship. Nili and Rastad (2007)
identify a dominant role of the government in investment and a weak private sector as
the main drivers of relatively low financial development. Berglo¨f and Lehmann (2009,
2For an overview of the resource curse literature, see, e.g., the World Trade Report (2010).
3In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, more recent studies claim that exceedingly
large financial sectors may be bad for growth (Arcand, Berkes and Panizza 2011). However, in a broad
cross-section of countries, many with developing and emerging economies, higher financial development
may generally be considered advantageous, in particular in the long run.
4Here, the export share of resources is depicted as log[share/(1 − share)]. “Log” refers to the
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Figure 1: Financial Development (private credit to GDP) and Resource Abundance
(export share of resources).
p.199) argue that “bulkiness of investment and a lack of demand for broader financial
services” might play a role, but remain silent on the details or empirical underpinning.
Yuxiang and Chen (2011) name four possible mechanisms: first, a resource boom of-
ten weakens the tradable sector of an economy. Accordingly, there is less support for
liberal trade policies, which are generally positively correlated with financial devel-
opment. Second, rent-seeking and corruption in resource-based economies undermine
a government’s credibility and thus its ability to promote reliable financial sector re-
forms. Opportunities for rent-seeking may also reduce the activity and credit demand
of entrepreneurs. Third, the detrimental effect of resource abundance on human capital
(see Section 2) may weaken the social capital of an economy, that is, its level of trust.
Since trust plays an important role for financial contracts, financial development may
shrink as well (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2004b). Fourth, the finding of Gylfason
and Zoega (2006) that resource abundance negatively affects productive investment
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may also have implications for the financial sector.
Another argument is that the macroeconomic volatility caused by cyclical and highly
uncertain commodity prices generally weakens financial development, as has been sug-
gested by Kurronen (2012). The author further points out that local incumbents,
especially in the resource sectors, tend to prevent financial reforms in order to deter
competitors from market entry, who typically rely more on external finance at the
beginning (see also Rajan and Zingales 2003).
3.2 Financial Development and Demand for External Finance
This paper proposes and empirically investigates another channel by which the resource
curse may operate. The approach follows the assumption that firms’ financial depen-
dence and thus demand for external finance, ceteris paribus, determines the size of the
financial sector. If resource firms relied less on external finance than manufacturing
companies, there would be less credit demand in the economy and, therefore, a smaller
and less developed financial system.5
3.2.1 Theory
Rajan and Zingales (henceforth: RZ, 1998) show that industries systematically differ in
their need for external financing provided by the financial sector. They assume that this
is due to cross-sectoral differences in technology. The finding has become an important
building block for studies conducted on both growth and trade. In particular, Do and
Levchenko (2007) apply the concept in order to explain that demand in external finance
may shape an economy’s financial development.
They present a model with one factor, labor, and two goods (p.800). One good is
financially dependent (F ), the other is not (A). Entrepreneurs in the economy can
choose between the production of either of these goods. The simple good A uses a
linear technology with one unit of labor for one unit of A, while the production of
5Kurronen (2012) hints at a similar explanation, without exploring the idea further.
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F is more complicated due to additional financial constraints. In each period, the
investment project of an entrepreneur producing F experiences a liquidity shock that
may be either positive or negative. In order to fulfill possible liquidity need, agents can
borrow on a spot credit market, where capital is provided by entrepreneurs with excess
liquidity (p.801). The model finds that the probability of a firm’s liquidation shrinks
with an increase of the number of agents engaged in the F sector, indicating positive
spillovers and a “positive relation between the financial system’s size and its quality”
(p.802). Furthermore, this leads to less volatility in the total output of the constrained
sector. The authors show that in an autarky equilibrium the credit market is linear in
the size of this sector.
In a trade equilibrium, however, the outcome is different. Trade between two countries,
say “North” and “South,” emerges due to comparative advantage other than financial
development. We may assume here that there is a Ricardian productivity difference
with North having an advantage in the financially dependent sector. As a consequence,
North produces only good F and South, in contrast, only the simple good A. According
to the logic of the model, credit demand and lending in South decline to zero. This also
affects the financial system’s quality since a marginal entrepreneur can no longer insure
against liquidity shocks through borrowing (p.804). By contrast, North’s financial
system’s size and quality increase. Thus, the model is able to explain how the trade
pattern may influence a country’s financial development. Do and Levchenko (2007)
test this hypothesis empirically and, indeed, find a significant positive association.6
Their analysis, however, is limited to manufacturing sectors.
The close relationship between the financial sector’s size and financial depth is in line
with empirical finance literature (e.g., Do and Levchenko 2007, Levine and Schmukler
2006). Suitable and commonly used measures such as private credit to GDP and stock
market capitalization are discussed in the following sections. In addition, one may
question whether national financial markets still matter with increasing international-
ization since companies may just borrow on foreign capital markets. Evidence from the
finance literature suggests the opposite, however. Pagano, Randl, Ro¨ell and Zechner
6They apply the RZ-type measure of external dependence.
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(2001) analyze firms’ cross-listing decisions at international stock exchanges, and find
that local financial development remains to be an important determinant of a region’s
economic well-being. This view is supported by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004a),
who show that in the financially well-integrated Italian regions, a higher regional level
of financial development enhances the economic activity of local individuals.
The present paper does not claim that financial markets are only shaped by the in-
dustry’s credit demand. An economy’s general level of wealth (income per capita),
legal origin, financial regulation and trade openness play an important role as well (La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1998, Mayer and Sussman 2001, Rajan
and Zingales 2003).
3.2.2 Applying the Theory to the Resource Curse
How does the theory of Do and Levchenko (2007) apply to the natural resource curse?
The answer relates to the external dependence of resource firms. A resource-dominated
economy with a high concentration of economic activity in few resource sectors may
be similar to country South (see 3.2.1) if resource sectors were financially independent.
Indeed, researchers have often supposed that resource companies such as oil and gas
producers rely less on external financing than others (Guriev, Plekhanov and Sonin
2009, Beck 2011). Hattendorff (2012) takes a closer look at the resource sectors’ finance
need in different countries by comparing various measuring approaches. This particular
study shows that the resource sectors’ financial dependence relative to manufacturing
differs with the measure used. Table 1 shows that the resource sectors coal mining,
crude petroleum and natural gas production, metal ore mining as well as other mining
(ISIC Rev. 2) are rather financially dependent when the measure captures long-term
financing need. An example is the RZ-type measure, which is calculated as capital
expenditures minus operative cash flow divided by capital expenditures. In contrast,
resource sectors rely less on external finance when the ratio of inventories to sales,
which accounts for short-term liquidity need, is used.7 This is true for oil and gas, in
7Using the figures of ISIC sector 353 instead of 220 for the match with oil exports below does not
alter the regression results in Section 5 substantially.
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particular. A meaningful financial channel of the resource curse is therefore linked to
a scenario where a country’s aggregate finance need measured by inventories to sales
has a significant influence on financial development. It seems reasonable to surmise
that short-term (and medium-term) credit in particular is provided by local banks.
In contrast, long-term finance could be assumed to come mostly from equity markets.
In the following empirical analysis, I will concentrate on short-term credit demand
and bank-based measures of financial development such as private credit to GDP.
Stock market measures will be used for robustness checks. This approach takes into
consideration that my samples include developing and emerging countries, which are
less suitable for investigating more sophisticated equity-based financing relations.
A list of resource and manufacturing sectors ranked by their financial dependence
is depicted in Appendix Table 8. Since external dependence of sectors is relatively
stable over time and across countries, figures based on U.S. data may be used for the
calculation of each country’s finance need. High financial development in the United
States ensures that data are reliable and comprehensive. Applying these figures to
other countries’ industries also avoids the problem that firms’ financial dependence
is endogenous to the country’s specific financial development (Kroszner, Laeven and
Klingebiel 2007).
4 Empirical Strategy and Data
There are two hypotheses to be tested: first, a general negative relationship between fi-
nancial development and resource abundance, as supposed in Figure 1; second, in order
to find an explanation for this phenomenon, a positive association between financial
development and a country’s aggregate short-term credit demand.
4.1 Financial Development and Resource Abundance
As mentioned in Section 3, many resource-rich countries seem to have a less developed
financial sector. The paper investigates this relationship more formally by examining
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Financial Dependence across Sectors
ISIC Sector RZ-type Measure Inventories to Sales
Rev. 2 1990-2009 1990-2009
(1) (2)
210 Coal mining −0.24 0.05
220 Crude petroleum and natural gas produc-
tion
0.58 0.00
230 Metal ore mining 4.79 0.16
290 Other mining −0.30 0.14
311 Food products −0.68 0.11
313 Beverages 0.02 0.08
314 Tobacco −5.11 0.17
321 Textile −1.04 0.16
322 Apparel −1.25 0.17
324 Footwear −2.34 0.20
331 Wood products −1.33 0.10
332 Furniture −2.24 0.11
341 Paper and products −1.00 0.11
342 Printing and publishing −2.06 0.05
351 Industrial chemicals −0.38 0.10
352 Other chemicals −0.92 0.13
3522 Drugs 38.16 0.08
353 Petroleum refineries −0.45 0.06
354 Petroleum and coal products 7.75 0.17
355 Rubber products −0.01 0.15
356 Plastic products −0.37 0.12
369 Nonmetal products −0.11 0.13
371 Iron and steel −0.44 0.16
372 Nonferrous metal −0.19 0.14
381 Metal products −1.45 0.14
382 Machinery −0.84 0.18
3825 Office and computing 1.11 0.13
383 Electric machinery −0.37 0.18
3832 Communication equipment −0.41 0.16
384 Transportation equipment −0.16 0.17
3843 Motor vehicles −0.21 0.12
385 Professional goods 0.54 0.19
390 Other industries 0.07 0.17
Correlation 1 −0.16a
(1) The RZ-type measure is calculated as (CAPXt−OANCFt)/CAPXt, where CAPX denotes capital expenditures
and OANCF net cash flow from operative activities (in Compustat items). (2) The ratio of inventories to sales is
calculated as INV T/SALE. Sector classification is ISIC Rev. 2. Data are not available for agricultural sectors. See
Hattendorff (2012). a Insignificant value.
Table 1
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a cross-section of countries with averages over time. The estimating equation is:
FDc = α + β RESOURCESc + γXc + ǫc, (1)
where FDc is a measure of country c’s financial development, RESOURCESc is a
measure of resource abundance and Xc is a vector of control variables. ǫc denotes the
error term. The controls include the country’s level of income per capita, its trade
openness and dummies for legal origin. More information on the data will be given in
Section 4.4. Estimations are done with ordinary least squares (OLS). The expectation
is to find a negative coefficient β. Robustness checks include alternative measures of
financial development and of resource abundance. In particular, potentially endogenous
measures such as resource exports to total exports are substituted by measures that are
more exogenous to other economic variables and refer to the pure natural endowment.
Furthermore, I control for the quality of institutions.
4.2 Financial Development and External Finance Need of Ex-
ports
The theoretical model presented above suggests that countries whose industries show
less credit demand tend to have a less developed financial sector. This may include
resource-abundant countries when we look at short-term financial dependence. To show
this empirically, I follow the strategy proposed by Do and Levchenko (2007) and adjust
it to the purposes of the resource curse analysis.
An economy’s aggregate credit demand is proxied by its external finance need of ex-





Subscript c indexes countries, i industries and t time periods. ωict denotes the share of
sector i’s exports in total exports from country c in t, including both manufacturing
and natural resources. EDi is the measure of sector i’s financial dependence. Due to
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data availability and the instrumentation strategy applied, I use export data instead
of output data for calculating a country’s aggregate credit demand. An analysis of the
aggregate external finance need in manufacturing calculated with trade data (Do and
Levchenko 2007, p.826) and output data (Almeida and Wolfenzon 2005, p.149) shows
that both measures are, indeed, highly positively correlated (correlation coefficient of
0.72).
I estimate the following equation with OLS in a cross-section of countries:
FDc = α + β EFNXc + γXc + ǫc, (3)
where the left-hand side variable is again the measure of financial development. Con-
trol variables are the same as in regression equation (1), that is, income per capita,
trade openness and legal system. The variables are averaged over several time periods.
In this regression, predictions from Section 3 are supported if the coefficient β is signif-
icantly larger than zero. Sensitivity analysis includes alternative measures of financial
development, a variation of country samples as well as measures of institutional quality
and export concentration as additional control variables.
In order to control for omitted variables, I use a panel specification with country
and time fixed effects. This is possible since most variables change over time. More
precisely, I run the following estimation with OLS:
FDct = α + β EFNXct + γXct + δc + δt + ǫct, (4)
with δc for country fixed effects and δt for time fixed effects. The panel specification is
estimated on a sample of non-overlapping five-year and ten-year averages.
4.3 Causality
The estimations presented in the two previous subsections are prone to endogeneity
problems since financial development may affect the right-hand side variables as well.
It is thus important to carefully identify the direction of causality.
14
Concerning the relationship between financial development and natural resource abun-
dance, the problem can be solved by using pure geographical measures of resource
endowment. Financial markets are rather unlikely to affect measures that refer to the
actual subsoil wealth.
However, in the case of estimating equations (3) and (4), which relate financial de-
velopment to the external finance need of exports, it is more complicated to control
for endogeneity. A country’s level of financial development will certainly influence its
trade structure. This view has been supported by a number of studies in the finance
and trade literature. They show that in the presence of credit constraints, quality and
size of financial markets may be a source of comparative advantage, thereby offering
an additional explanation for international trade patterns. Among others, Beck (2002)
as well as Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005) find empirical evidence that a high level of
financial development fosters exports in financially dependent industries.
In order to identify a causal link between the external finance need of a country’s
exports and the financial system, it is therefore necessary to accurately address the
endogeneity problem. This is done with an instrumentation strategy that follows Do
and Levchenko (2007, p.806). To overcome endogeneity, we need a variable that is
highly correlated with the original one, that is, the external finance need of exports,
but uncorrelated with the error term. More precisely, this means finding an instrument
for the trade structure, which is done with the gravity approach that has been proposed
by Frankel and Romer (1999). These authors predict trade as a share of GDP on
the basis of a gravity regression of bilateral trade volumes on merely geographical
explanatory variables like distance and land area. The obtained coefficients are used to
predict bilateral trade between country pairs. These figures are then summed up over
all trading partners of a country in order to get the predicted total trade relative to
GDP. While the analysis by Frankel and Romer (1999) is limited to the national level,
Do and Levchenko (2007, p.806) modify the approach by also considering the sectoral
level. Thus, they are able to predict a country’s trade structure rather than just its
general ratio of trade to GDP. Relying on Frankel and Romer (1999), the following
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regression equation is estimated for each sector i:
LogEXPicd = α + η
1
i ldistcd + η
2
i lpopc + η
3
i lareac + η
4
i lpopd + η
5
i laread
+ η6i landlockedcd + η
7
i bordercd + η
8
i bordercd ∗ ldistcd
+ η9i bordercd ∗ popc + η
10
i bordercd ∗ areac + η
11
i bordercd ∗ popd
+ η12i bordercd ∗ aread + η
13
i bordercd ∗ landlockedcd
+ η14i subsoilintotalwealthc + η
15
i subsoilintotalwealthd + ǫcd.
(5)
The left-hand side variable LogEXPicd denotes the log of exports from country c to
d relative to GDP in industry i.8 Relating trade to sectoral GDP ensures that we
control for a country’s size. This is important since large countries tend to trade less
with their neighbors, in relative terms, than small ones. For example, Germans surely
engage extensively in trade with Germans, while Belgians trade comparatively less
with their own countrymen as they have fewer fellow citizens to trade with (Frankel
and Romer 1999, p.380). The geographical explanatory variables at the right-hand side
include the log of bilateral distance between the two countries’ major cities ldistcd, the
log of country c’s population lpopc, the log of its land area lareac and both variables
for trade partner d, respectively. The dummy variable landlockedcd indicates whether
none, one or both of the countries are landlocked by taking the value of zero, one or
two. bordercd is a common-border dummy. Since the presence of a common border will
most likely alter the effect of all previous variables, the right-hand side also consists
of interaction terms with bordercd. In addition to Do and Levchenko (2007), this
paper adds subsoilintotalwealth, which denotes the subsoil in total wealth for both
the exporter c and importer d (see Data Description 4.4).
The coefficients I obtain from these regressions by sector are then used to predict the log
of exports to GDP in sector i from country c to d, ̂LogEXPicd.
9 Since the construction
of the finance need of exports requires the sectoral export share in total exports, not
sectoral bilateral exports, I take the exponential of ̂LogEXPicd, and sum over all trade
8See also di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009).
9Hats indicate predicted values.
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̂LogEXPicd , where d 6= c. (6)





With predicted rather than actual trade shares of sectors, it is now possible to construct
the instrument for the main right-hand side variable, external finance need of exports





While trade literature shows that gravity approaches deliver astonishingly good predic-
tions of actual trade volumes at the national level, one might be more reluctant towards
a strategy predicting countries’ trade structures with the corresponding sectoral disag-
gregation. In particular, it could be argued that the geographical determinants used as
explanatory variables refer to the national level and do not vary across industries. How-
ever, since the gravity regression is estimated for each sector i, the estimated gravity
coefficients ηi also differ across sectors and thus the predicted exports to GDP ÊXPic
within a country. The supposition is that goods with a highly negative coefficient on
distance, for example, will be traded less with trading partners that are far away from
the home country than other products. Other export goods might react sensitively
to whether there is a common border between country c and d. That is, the sectors’
export behavior is differently affected by the geographical determinants in the gravity
equation (5). Obviously, significant variation of the gravity coefficients across indus-
tries is important for the instrumentation strategy to work. Whether this is indeed the
case, is tested in Section 5. Do and Levchenko (2007) list both theoretical and empiri-
cal studies that support the view that these coefficients differ across sectors. Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003, 2004) show, for example, that coefficients on distance and bor-
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der depend on trade costs and the elasticity of substitution between product varieties
within an industry. Both factors may well differ across sectors according to empirical
literature.
Another potential objection to the approach might be the presence of zero trade ob-
servations when two countries do not trade in a particular sector. There is a high
probability that two small countries that are far away from each other do not trade in
every sector. Do and Levchenko (2007) find that this phenomenon is less of a prob-
lem. One reason is that trade patterns rather than volumes are estimated, and country
pairs with no bilateral trade at all can be easily ignored. Nevertheless, the instru-
ment may still be biased since the procedure predicts zero trade when it observes zero
trade. The authors conduct a number of robustness checks to avoid this problem and
find convincing evidence that zero trade observations are not a major concern for the
instrumentation strategy.10
The instrument for the external finance need of exports is used in regression equa-
tion (3) with two-stage least squares (2SLS). While the approach is able to account
for several important issues of endogeneity, two common restrictions, which apply to
instruments, remain: a potential measurement error in regressors and the omitted-
variable bias. The latter is captured in the panel analysis.
4.4 Data Description
In the following section, data and data sources are described in more detail. It presents
the measures of financial development and resource abundance, the data to construct
the external finance need of exports, the control variables as well as the different samples
used.
10Among others, they estimate the gravity equation in levels applying a Poisson pseudo-maximum
likelihood estimator with zero trade observations.
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4.4.1 Financial Development
The present paper exploits the cross-country variation in finance. It is, therefore,
crucial to use an appropriate measure of an economy’s level of financial development.
The most commonly used measure in the finance literature is the ratio of private
(domestic) credit to GDP, that is, the amount of credit by banks and other private
financial institutions to the private sector as a share of GDP (Rajan and Zingales 1998,
p.569). As mentioned above, there is reason to assume that the quality of a financial
system is a function of its size (Do and Levchenko 2007, p.799). A similar measure
is the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP (M2/GDP). Alternatively, it is possible to use
a country’s stock market trade value or stock market capitalization relative to GDP.
While neither stock market measure reflects the actual amount of funding obtained by
borrowers, these composites are considered to be suitable proxies for general financial
development. In contrast, the stock market turnover ratio, defined as the value of
total shares traded divided by the average real market capitalization, is a proxy for
the stock market’s activity and not for its size. The net interest margin, which is the
accounting value of banks’ net interest revenue as a share of interest-bearing assets,
is another possibility for avoiding using the financial sector’s size (Do and Levchenko
2007, p.821). Generally, the measures presented here are positively correlated, with
the exception of the net interest margin, where a low value suggests a well-developed
financial system. All measures are taken from Beck and Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt (2009).
4.4.2 Resource Abundance
Measures of resource abundance include the share of natural resources—that is, coal, oil
and gas, metal ores and other mining products—in total (manufacturing and natural
resources) exports. Alternatively, I use the share of oil and natural gas exports in
total exports. I calculate both measures on the basis of the below trade data. Also,
more pure measures of a country’s resource endowment are used. These are subsoil
wealth per capita and subsoil wealth in total national wealth provided by the World
Bank (2006). Subsoil wealth includes oil, natural gas, coal and mineral resources, while
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total wealth includes all natural assets (e.g., forests) as well as produced capital and
intangible capital.11
4.4.3 External Finance Need of Exports
Data for the sectors’ financial dependence, that is, inventories to sales and the RZ-type
measure, come from Hattendorff (2012).
International trade data are taken from both the World Trade Database (Feenstra,
Lipsey, Deng, Ma and Mo 2005) for the time period 1970 to 2000 and UN Comtrade
for 2001 to 2007. These databases capture a large majority of bilateral trade flows and
provide data classified by the four-digit Standard International Trade Classification
(SITC) Revision 2. Since financial dependence data are classified by ISIC Rev. 2,
trade data are converted to (three-digit) ISIC Rev. 2 as well. This is partly done with
a correspondence table developed by Muendler (2009). The convergence allows for
constructing the measure of external finance need of exports EFNX. In addition, these
data are used to calculate the export concentration variables for robustness checks.
The same sources of trade data are used for the left-hand side variable of the gravity
equation, where the additionally required GDP data at the sectoral level come from the
United Nations Industrial Development Organization’s database INDSTAT4 and the
UNIDO publication “World Statistics on Mining and Utilities” (2010). Data are again
converted to three-digit ISIC Rev. 2. Due to small inconsistencies in the matching
of the sector classifications ISIC Rev. 2 and 3, the plastic products sector (356) has
to be dropped here. A database from Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations
Internationales (CEPII) provides geographical data for the right-hand side variables
that reflect bilateral distances between two countries’ major cities, land area as well
as information on whether a country is landlocked and whether two countries share a
border (Head, Mayer and Ries 2010). Data on population come from the World Bank’s
“World Development Indicators.”
11Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010) argue that measures of subsoil wealth could also be endoge-
nous in growth regressions due to specific assumptions made for their calculation. Wealthy countries
tend to have higher values of subsoil wealth per capita according to World Bank figures.
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4.4.4 Further Variables
The control variables real GDP per capita (PPP adjusted) and trade openness (sum of
imports and exports as a share of GDP) come from the Penn World Tables (Heston,
Summers and Aten 2011). Data on the legal system are based on La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998).
Further robustness checks require measures of institutional quality. This information is
provided by the Polity IV index (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2011), which captures the
strength of democracy on a scale from −10 to 10. Second, the size of government, which
is proxied by government consumption spending to GDP (from Penn World Tables),
and where a high value indicates a low quality of institutions. Third, the property
rights index by the Heritage Foundation capturing the protection of private property
on a scale from 0.1 to 1. And fourth, the Economic Freedom of the World Index
(Gwartney, Lawson and Hall 2012), which is a composite including 42 components
of the categories government size, legal system, property rights, sound money (among
others, inflation), freedom to trade internationally as well as flexible regulations (credit
market, labor market, doing business).
4.4.5 Samples
Different samples are used in the analysis. The first sample for the regression of finan-
cial development on natural resource abundance consists of 78 countries for the time
period 1970 to 2007, while the second one covers 84 countries. The latter captures a
shorter time period, from 1992 to 2007, which makes it possible to include a number of
former socialist economies. The corresponding samples for the regression of financial
development on the external finance need of exports are somewhat larger: 93 and 110
countries. The sample used for the 2SLS estimation consists of only 33 countries from
1992 to 2007 due to limited sectoral GDP data, especially for figures on resources. A
list of countries is depicted in Appendix Table 14.
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5 Results
This section presents the empirical results. The first part deals with the relation
between a country’s level of financial development and its natural resource abundance.
The second part relates financial development and the aggregated credit demand of
a country in a cross-section and in a panel specification, and it reports the results of
the instrumentation strategy. As indicated in Section 3, I focus on a scenario where
firms’ financial dependence is measured by inventories to sales. Further robustness
checks test whether institutional quality or export concentration are important for the
analysis.
5.1 Financial Development and Resource Abundance
As outlined in Section 3, it is reasonable to test empirically whether there is a nega-
tive relationship between resource abundance and a country’s financial system before
investigating a possible mechanism of the financial channel in more detail. I run cross-
sectional OLS regressions with a sample of 78 countries, estimating equation (1) with
various measures of financial development and resource abundance. In order to miti-
gate the problem of an unbalanced panel, averages of all variables from 1970 to 2007 are
taken. The results are reported in Table 2 with robust standard errors in parentheses
and where the columns represent different specifications. The first specification is a
simple bivariate regression of financial development on resource abundance measured
by private credit to GDP and the export share of resources, respectively. The coeffi-
cient on resource abundance is −0.463 and significant at the 1% level. The following
specifications add other variables suited for explaining a country’s level of financial
development such as income per capita and trade openness (Column 2). It does not
come as a surprise that wealth is positively correlated with a large private credit mar-
ket. Trade openness appears to be insignificant. The coefficient on resource abundance
remains significantly negative. This is also true in Column 3, including legal origin
dummies, where the R2 is 0.71.
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Financial Development and Resource Abundance
OLS Cross-section, Averages, 1970-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. (FD) Pr.Credit/GDP Pr.Credit/GDP Pr.Credit/GDP Pr.Credit/GDP








Resource Abundance −0.463∗∗∗ −0.245∗∗ −0.173∗∗ −0.239∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.075) (0.072) (0.081)
Log(Income) 0.183∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.021) (0.024)
Log(Trade Openness) 0.039 0.040 0.030
(0.056) (0.047) (0.047)
British Legal Origin 0.013 0.426∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.080)
French Legal Origin −0.112 0.282∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.069)
Socialist Legal Origin −0.354∗∗∗
(0.096)
German Legal Origin 0.378∗ 0.785∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.139)




Constant 0.555∗∗∗ −1.224∗∗∗ −0.971∗∗∗ −1.446∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.230) (0.258) (0.217)
Observations 78 78 78 77
R2 0.14 0.57 0.71 0.70
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Variables
are averaged over the period 1970-2007. In all specifications, financial development (FD) is measured by private
credit to GDP, while resource abundance is captured by the export share of resources. Log(Income) is the log of
real GDP per capita, and Log(Trade Openness) is the log of total trade to GDP (both from Penn World Tables).
The legal origin dummies come from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). The index Polity IV
measures the strength of democratic institutions (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2011).
Table 2
In the context of the resource curse, it is often argued that institutions play an im-
portant role (see Section 2). For this reason, I control for institutional quality using
the Polity IV index, which is frequently applied in the literature. As can be seen in
Column 4, however, this variable does not have a significant effect on the left-hand
side variable.12 It seems that the negative relationship between financial system and
resources cannot simply be explained by institutional shortcomings. The coefficient on
resource abundance remains significant when government size as a measure of insti-
tutional quality is used. With a measure of economic freedom or of property rights,
the results are ambiguous, but do not generally contradict the negative link between
12It remains insignificant when the legal origin dummies are dropped.
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finance and resources (not depicted in the tables).
Furthermore, I check the robustness of these results using alternative measures of re-
source abundance. The results of a specification with control variables income per
capita, trade openness and legal origin are depicted in Table 3. When resource abun-
dance is measured by the export share of just oil and natural gas without mining
products, the negative relationship found above is stronger (Column 1). As indicated
in the description of methods, it is even more important to vary the resource variable
using a pure, exogenous measure such as subsoil wealth per capita or the share of sub-
soil in total wealth in order to overcome the simultaneity problem of the export shares
of resources used so far. Both coefficients on the main right-hand side variable (Column
2 and 3) are negative and significant, as before. The magnitude of the coefficient on
pure subsoil wealth per capita, however, is very low.
In addition, the measures of financial development are varied. In detail, these are the
ratios of liquid liabilities, stock market trade value and stock market capitalization
to GDP, the stock market turnover ratio and the net interest margin. Selected results
using two of them, the stock market trade value to GDP and the stock market turnover
ratio, are depicted in Table 3, with wealth, trade openness and legal origin dummies as
control variables. Still, coefficients on resource abundance are negative and significantly
different from zero with values of −0.196 and −0.315. However, other combinations of
financial development and resource abundance measures deliver less significant results
and R2 tends to shrink (not depicted in the tables).
The same analysis is conducted for a sample covering the period 1992 to 2007, which
includes a number of former Soviet countries. Appendix Table 9 shows the specifica-
tions as in Column 3 of Table 2, with income per capita, openness and legal origin as
controls. Again, measures of resource abundance and financial development are varied.
Overall, the results are in line with the findings from above.
Thus, we can state that resource-abundant countries tend to have a less developed fi-
nancial system. In the majority of regressions, the size of the effect does not appear to
be negligible. Generally, measures of resource abundance that refer to the export struc-
ture show a stronger negative correlation with financial development than measures of
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Financial Development and Resource Abundance
Robustness, OLS Cross-section, Averages, 1970-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
















Resource Abundance −0.217∗∗∗ −1 ∗ 10−5∗∗∗ −0.172∗∗ −0.196∗∗ −0.315∗∗
(0.062) (3.2 ∗ 10−6) (0.073) (0.092) (0.132)
Other Controls Log(Income), Log(Trade Openness), Legal Origin Dummies
Constant −0.998∗∗∗ −1.534∗∗∗ −1.074∗∗∗ −0.825∗ 0.578
(0.257) (0.237) (0.256) (0.433) (0.594)
Observations 78 77 78 65 65
R2 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.46 0.44
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Variables
are averaged over the period 1970-2007. The resource abundance measure is varied using the export share of resources
(4 and 5), the export share of oil and gas (1), subsoil wealth per capita (2) and subsoil in total wealth (3). Selected
measures of financial development (FD) are private credit to GDP (1 to 3), the stock market trade value to GDP (4)
and the stock market turnover ratio (5). Log(Income) is the log of real GDP per capita, and Log(Trade Openness)
is the log of total trade to GDP (both from Penn World Tables). The legal origin dummies come from La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). a Without Norway, which is a strong outlier.
Table 3
pure subsoil wealth. Resource dominance as opposed to general resource wealth seems
to harm finance. These results are basically in line with Yuxiang and Chen (2011),
Beck (2011) and Kurronen (2012).13
5.2 Financial Development and External Finance Need of Ex-
ports
Armed with this finding, we can now turn to an empirical investigation of a mecha-
nism that is able to explain why resource-rich and, in particular, resource-dominated
countries tend to have a less developed financial system. As described in Section 3, the
13The presented analysis is confined to a cross-section of countries here. The above literature, which
also uses panel data, suggests that resources are essentially associated with lower bank-based financial
development, as captured by private credit to GDP. The negative link between resources and stock
markets is less pronounced.
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external dependence of resource sectors may play a role. The hypothesis to be tested
is whether credit demand by sectors, proxied by the (short-term) external finance need
of exports, affects a country’s financial development.
5.2.1 Cross-sectional Analysis
Financial Development and External Finance Need of Exports
OLS Cross-section, Averages, 1970-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. (FD) Pr.Credit/GDP Pr.Credit/GDP Pr.Credit/GDP Stock Market Capi-
talization/GDP
EFNX 1.900∗∗∗ 2.500∗∗∗ 1.976∗∗∗ 2.693∗∗
(0.686) (0.526) (0.501) (1.164)
Log(Income) 0.188∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.036)
Log(Trade Openness) 0.079 0.075 0.220∗∗
(0.056) (0.050) (0.090)
British Legal Origin 0.049 0.328∗∗
(0.106) (0.161)
French Legal Origin −0.041 −0.052
(0.098) (0.121)
Socialist Legal Origin −0.249∗∗∗ −0.057
(0.093) (0.184)
German Legal Origin 0.372∗∗∗ 0.071
(0.139) (0.294)
Constant 0.198∗∗∗ −1.787∗∗∗ −1.568∗∗∗ −2.774∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.266) (0.321) (0.723)
Observations 93 93 93 76
R2 0.05 0.61 0.70 0.52
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Variables
are averaged over the period 1970-2007. In specifications 1 to 3, financial development (FD) is measured by private
credit to GDP, while 4 uses stock market capitalization to GDP. EFNX is the external finance need of exports, which
is calculated using inventories to sales. Log(Income) is the log of real GDP per capita, and Log(Trade Openness)
is the log of total trade to GDP (both from Penn World Tables). The legal origin dummies come from La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998).
Table 4
a. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression
The first cross-sectional OLS regressions are conducted with a sample of 93 countries
and data averages over 38 years, that is, from 1970 to 2007. The results are shown in
Table 4, with robust standard errors in parentheses. In Column 1, financial develop-
ment (private credit to GDP) is regressed on the external finance need of exports, that
is, on the economy’s aggregate credit demand of firms. Firms’ financial dependence
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EDi from equation (2) is measured by inventories to sales. The coefficient on the right-
hand side variable EFNX is 1.900 and significant at the 1% level. The R2, however, is
rather low. Columns 2 and 3 present the results of specifications including the control
variables income per capita, trade openness and legal origin dummies. As expected,
wealth is positively related to the size of the credit market. Trade openness, however, is
insignificant in all specifications. Column 3 shows that especially a socialist legal origin
negatively affects the financial system. Here, the EFNX variable is still significant at
the 1% level (β = 1.976), and R2 is much higher than in the first specification.
In order to check these estimates for robustness, alternative measures of financial de-
velopment are applied instead of private credit to GDP. As in Section 5.1, this includes
the ratios of liquid liabilities, stock market trade value and stock market capitalization
to GDP, the stock market turnover ratio and the net interest margin. The regression
result with stock market capitalization is demonstrated in Table 4 in Column 4. Over-
all, the results are mixed. With liquid liabilities and stock market capitalization to
GDP, the coefficients on EFNX are positive and significant as above, even though
the R2 is only at around 0.50. The coefficients are insignificant, however, when the
financial system’s quality is proxied by the other three measures (not depicted in the
tables).
Nevertheless, in the cross-section, there is some evidence that the external finance
need of exports measured by short-term financial dependence might be correlated with
financial development. This result would, indeed, suggest a credit demand channel of
the resource curse.14
Furthermore, I run all regressions and robustness checks described above with a sample
including more countries (110) at the expense of a shorter time period covered (1992 to
2007). The results obtained from these estimations are strongly in line with those from
the 1970-2007 sample. Again, the external finance need of exports with inventories to
sales is significantly related to financial development.
14EFNX is clearly insignificant in all specifications when it is calculated with the Rajan-Zingales-
type measure instead of inventories to sales. This result continues to hold when the exact calculation
of cash flow is varied, as proposed in Hattendorff (2012).
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b. Instrumentation Strategy
As outlined in Section 4.3, the external finance need of exports, the main right-hand
side variable, may be endogenous. That is, the trade structure could be influenced by
financial development itself. The results of the instrumentation strategy are presented
below.
The approach allows only cross-sectional analysis, and limited availability of data leads
to a smaller sample covering fewer countries over a shorter time period. More precisely,
I use a sample with 33 countries from 1992 to 2007. First, I estimate the gravity
equation (5) at the sectoral level, that is, for each of the 32 sectors. The data are
averaged over the whole period. The estimation results with all relevant variables are
depicted in the Appendix Tables 10 to 13, where each column represents an industry.
The number of observations differs across the sector-level gravity regressions, ranging
from 350 (coal mining) to 2, 542 (machinery). The R2s are between 0.19 and 0.56.
How can we interpret the sectors’ coefficients on the geographical determinants? As
expected, distance clearly mitigates the ratio of bilateral exports to GDP. The farther
away countries are, the less they trade with each other. According to Frankel and
Romer (1999, p.384), the coefficients on the exporter’s population and area are sup-
posed to be negative, too, since agents in large countries, such as the United States,
have more opportunities to trade with their fellow citizens and are farther away from
customers beyond their own border. This distance argument is also applied to ex-
plain why the importer’s land area negatively affects bilateral trade to GDP. These
predictions are only partly supported by the data from my gravity estimation. On
the other hand, a large population of the importer provides good market opportuni-
ties and increases bilateral exports significantly. Not surprisingly, landlocked countries
trade considerably less. A common border tends to increase bilateral trade, whereas
this is less obvious when border interaction terms are included in the regression. Over-
all, the coefficients’ size and signs correspond rather well to those obtained by Frankel
and Romer (1999) at the aggregate national level.
Do and Levchenko (2007) point out that the gravity coefficients have to differ across
28
industries. Since all geographical right-hand side variables are the same in the set of
industry-level estimations, predicted trade values would just be the same, too, if η1−15
were equal across sectors. However, comparing the coefficients in Appendix Tables 10
to 13 shows that they differ significantly in magnitude. For example, η1 on ldistcd (log
of bilateral distance) ranges from −1.998 to −0.436. Thus, expanding the Frankel-
Romer approach to a sector-level analysis is possible. Armed with the fifteen estimates
on the geographical variables, I predict bilateral exports as a share of GDP for each
industry and country, and calculate the predicted external finance need of exports as
described in Section 4.
The 2SLS regression results are presented in Table 5, where EFNX calculated with in-
ventories to sales is instrumented by ÊFNX and the corresponding controls. Column
1 reports a simple bivariate regression, while the other columns add the set of control
variables that are known from above. The bottom panel refers to the first stage of the
estimation. The coefficient on ÊFNX ranges from 1.754 to 2.585 and is significant
at the 10% level or at the 5% level. The partial R2s are between 0.14 and 0.22. The
partial F-statistics range from rather low 2.89 to 4.82. The second-stage outcomes are
presented in the top panel of Table 5. The coefficient on EFNX is clearly insignificant
in the bivariate regression (t-statistics of 0.39). With the additional control variables
income per capita and trade openness, it is significant at the 1% level and very high
in magnitude (5.467). Including legal origin dummies increases the coefficient even
further, but lowers significance. The variation of financial development measures does
not alter this finding substantially (the specifications with stock market capitalization
and the stock market trade value are depicted in the table).15 So, by and large, the
external finance need of exports calculated with inventories to sales seems to increase a
country’s financial development. This corresponds to the outcome of the cross-sectional
OLS analysis above.
15When EFNX is calculated with the RZ-type measure, the instrumentation strategy fails, as
indicated by the weak instrument diagnostics.
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Financial Development and External Finance Need of Exports
2SLS Cross-section, Averages, 1992-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: 2nd Stage












EFNX 1.482 5.467∗∗∗ 7.138∗∗ 6.431∗∗ 6.231∗∗
(3.763) (1.968) (2.970) (3.370) (3.005)
Log(Income) 0.351∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗ 0.123 0.139∗∗
(0.067) (0.095) (0.117) (0.069)
Log(Trade Openness) −0.035 0.087 −0.039 −0.102
(0.100) (0.116) (0.126) (0.121)
British Legal Origin −0.011 0.742∗∗∗ 0.275
(0.188) (0.237) (0.307)
French Legal Origin −0.270∗ 0.197 0.052
(0.156) (0.134) (0.269)
Socialist Legal Origin −0.545∗∗ 0.020 −0.085
(0.212) (0.228) (0.299)
Scandinavian Legal Origin −0.170 0.446∗∗ 0.313
(0.210) (0.163) (0.272)
Constant 0.491 −3.231∗∗∗ −2.579∗∗ −1.588 −1.401
(0.445) (0.732) (0.973) (1.083) (1.080)
Panel B: 1st Stage
Dep. Var. EFNX EFNX EFNX EFNX EFNX
ÊFNX 1.754∗ 1.857∗ 2.540∗∗ 2.585∗∗ 2.585∗∗
(1.033) (0.915) (1.157) (1.181) (1.181)
Partial F-Test 2.89 4.12 4.82 4.79 4.79
Partial R2 0.14 0.15 0.22 0.22 0.22
Observations 33 33 33 34 34
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Variables
are averaged over the period 1992-2007. In specifications 1 to 3, financial development (FD) is measured by private
credit to GDP, while 4 uses stock market capitalization, and 5 the stock market trade value. EFNX is the external
finance need of exports, which is calculated using inventories to sales. Log(Income) is the log of real GDP per
capita, and Log(Trade Openness) is the log of total trade to GDP (both from Penn World Tables). The legal origin
dummies come from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). ÊFNX is the predicted EFNX based
on a gravity approach with geographical data.
Table 5
5.2.2 Panel Analysis
In the following, the results of the panel analysis are presented. The procedure makes it
possible to add a time-series dimension to the data and to control for omitted variables
that have not been considered in the cross-sectional estimation. As outlined in Section
4, both country and time fixed effects are applied. Hence, it is possible to control for
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unobserved time-invariant characteristics that are specific to a country, and for changes
over time in the global environment (Do and Levchenko 2007, p.824). A robust version
of the Hausman specification test shows a high chi-squared statistic with a p-value close
to zero. This means a fixed-effects approach is preferred to random effects. Obviously,
the assumption that random effects are orthogonal to the regressors does not hold here.
Due to limited data, regression equation (4) is estimated with OLS only.
Table 6 reports the regression results with a sample from 1970 to 2007 with non-
overlapping five-year averages, that is, 1970-1974, 1975-1979 etc., where the last average
covers only three years, 2005-2007. Taking five-year averages mitigates the problem
of an unbalanced panel and filters out short-run business cycle fluctuations (see, e.g.,
Huang and Temple 2005, p.12). In order to control for both heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation, standard errors clustered at the country level are applied. In contrast
to the previous estimations, only controls that vary over time can be used. This
excludes the variables capturing legal origin. Columns 1 and 2 show the estimations
with private credit to GDP. As expected, the log of income per capita is again significant
with a coefficient of 0.351. Trade openness is significant now, too. It does not come
as a surprise that the (overall) R2s are relatively high in all fixed-effects regressions.
Remarkably, the coefficient on the external finance need of exports with inventories to
sales is insignificant here.16
Varying the measures of financial development using the ratios of M2, stock market
trade value and stock market capitalization to GDP, the stock market turnover ratio
and the net interest margin rather confirms this finding (selected measures in Table
6 in Column 3 and 4).17 The above panel analysis is repeated with ten-year averages
instead of five-year averages. It turns out that these outcomes generally support the
ones previously obtained. The same is true for specifications with five-year averages
and lagged regressors using first and second lags (not depicted in the tables).18 As
in the cross-section, I also use a sample covering the period from 1992 to 2007 that
16The coefficient on the RZ-type EFNX is positive and significant at the 1% level, which corre-
sponds to the one obtained by Do and Levchenko (2007).
17In particular, there is no evidence that EFNX calculated with the short-term measure is more
correlated with credit market indices, or RZ-type EFNX with stock market indices, or vice versa.
18A GMM (generalized method of moments) approach following Arellano and Bond (1991) fails to
provide valid instruments.
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Financial Development and External Finance Need of Exports
OLS Panel Estimation, 5 Year Averages, 1970-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. (FD) Pr.Credit/GDP Pr.Credit/GDP M2/GDP Stock Market
Capitalization
/GDP
EFNX 0.546 0.268 0.566 1.059
(0.687) (0.650) (0.446) (1.788)
Log(Income) 0.351∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.235∗
(0.055) (0.044) (0.133)
Log(Trade Openness) 0.122∗∗ 0.062∗ 0.128
(0.050) (0.034) (0.129)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 679 673 671 369
No. of Countries 93 93 93 76
R2 0.80 0.84 0.90 0.84
Standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level. Non-overlapping five-year averages from 1970 to 2007. In specifications 1 and 2, financial development
(FD) is measured by private credit to GDP, while 3 uses liquid liabilities to GDP, and 4 stock market capitalization
to GDP. EFNX is the external finance need of exports, which is calculated using inventories to sales. Log(Income)
is the log of real GDP per capita, and Log(Trade Openness) is the log of total trade to GDP (both from Penn World
Tables).
Table 6
includes many of the former socialist countries. This allows only five-year averages to
be taken. The results, which are not reported in the tables, basically correspond to
those from before.19
In summary, we can say that controlling for omitted variables brings with it a con-
siderable change of results. When a country’s external finance need is calculated with
inventories to sales, it does not have a significant influence on financial development.
This contradicts the finding from 5.2.1.20
5.2.3 Interpretation of Results
As indicated above, the estimations deliver different results with regard to the link
between financial development and external credit demand. In the cross-sectional
19Some financial development variations provide too few observations to conduct meaningful esti-
mations.
20The exclusion of poor countries does not alter the results.
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analysis, the external finance need of exports (EFNX) calculated with inventories
to sales enters significantly in basically all specifications. This is true for both ordi-
nary least squares and two-stage least squares, and seems to confirm the hypothesis
that resource-based economies have lower financial development due to lower credit de-
mand. By contrast, the panel estimations in 5.2.2 show that EFNX calculated with
the short-term measure is clearly insignificant. This points to omitted variables in the
cross-section, which are partly controlled for in the fixed-effects estimation. Several
variables could come into question.
Financial Development and External Finance Need of Exports
Quality of Institutions and Export Concentration, OLS Cross-section, Averages, 1970-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












EFNX 1.632∗∗∗ 2.078∗∗∗ 1.435∗∗∗ 0.362 0.602 0.402







Economic Freedom Index 0.145∗∗∗
(0.038)






Other Controls Log(Income), Log(Trade Openness), Legal Origin Dummies
Constant −1.283∗∗∗ −1.456∗∗∗ −1.309∗∗∗ −1.018∗∗∗ −0.405 −1.114∗∗∗
(0.264) (0.298) (0.316) (0.285) (0.416) (0.325)
Observations 90 93 93 88 93 93
R2 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.74 0.74 0.74
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Variables are averaged over the period 1970-2007. The measure of financial development (FD) is private credit to
GDP. EFNX is the external finance need of exports, which is calculated using inventories to sales. Log(Income) is
the log of real GDP per capita, and Log(Trade Openness) is the log of total trade to GDP (both from Penn World
Tables). The legal origin dummies come from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). The quality
of institutions is measured by the Polity IV index (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2011), government size (government
consumption spending to GDP, Penn World Tables), the property rights index by the Heritage Foundation as well
as the Economic Freedom of the World Index (Gwartney, Lawson and Hall 2012). Export concentration is measured
by the concentration ratio, which sums up the export shares of the four largest export sectors, as well as the log of
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which sums up the square of export shares of all export sectors.
Table 7
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As in the regression of financial development on natural resource abundance in 5.1,
one may argue that institutions matter (see also Section 2). In order to control for
institutional quality, several measures are applied: the Polity IV index for the strength
of democracy, the size of government, the property rights index by the Heritage Foun-
dation and the Economic Freedom of the World Index, which is a composite of the
categories government size, legal system, property rights, sound money, freedom to
trade internationally and flexible regulations. Table 7 reports the estimation results
in the cross-section with private credit to GDP on the left-hand side. The right-hand
side variables are EFNX, the measures of institutional quality and the standard set
of controls, that is, national wealth, trade openness and legal origin. Variables are
averaged over the period 1970 to 2007. Sample size and R2 are similar to those above.
Except from the Polity IV index, all institutional variables are significant and have the
expected signs (Columns 1 to 4). Private property and the index of economic freedom
enter positively, government size negatively. In particular, I am interested in the change
of the coefficient on EFNX in comparison to the estimations without the quality of
institutions. Using Polity IV, government size or the property rights index, the external
finance need of exports variable is still positive and significant. This result does not
hold with the composite Economic Freedom Index (Column 4). However, if the index
is substituted by the sub-composites of its categories, EFNX is again significant (not
depicted in the tables). All estimation results are generally robust to the variation of
the financial development measure. Using the larger sample with averages from 1992 to
2007 as well as including institutional quality in the instrumentation strategy delivers
similar outcomes. Thus, institutions are unlikely to be the omitted variable.
Countries with low external finance need of exports often have only few export sec-
tors. This gives rise to the idea that export concentration—rather than short-term
external credit demand—may negatively affect financial development. To control for
this possible effect, two measures of export concentration are used: the concentration
ratio, which sums up the export shares of the four largest export sectors, as well as
the log of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which sums up the square of export shares
of all export sectors (see, e.g., Agosin, Alvarez and Bravo-Ortega 2012). The effect
of export concentration on financial development is estimated in a regression with the
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standard set of controls and EFNX (with inventories to sales) as the main right-hand
side variable (see Table 7, Columns 5 and 6). The sample covers 93 countries, variables
are averaged over the period 1970 to 2007. Tests show that multicollinearity is not
an issue here. Both coefficients on export concentration are negative and significant,
that is, lower diversification of exports is correlated with weaker financial markets.
Furthermore, the proxy for short-term credit demand EFNX is insignificant in both
specifications. This corresponds to the findings of the panel analysis. The results ba-
sically hold when the measure of financial development or the sample (110 countries
from 1992 to 2007) are varied. They continue to hold by and large when the equation
is estimated with 2SLS, applying the predicted EFNX as an instrument (not depicted
in the tables).
Hence, export concentration might be the omitted variable, which was partly controlled
for in the fixed-effects panel estimation. This additional result suggests that the hy-
pothesis of lower credit demand causing weaker financial development in resource-based
economies has to be rejected.
6 Conclusion
This paper argues that natural resource abundance might weaken a country’s financial
system. Since finance is considered to be important for economic growth, we can,
therefore, say that the natural resource curse, among others, operates through the
financial channel. I find a significant negative link between resource abundance, in
particular resource dominance, and financial development, which confirms previous
results found by the literature.
Furthermore, the study seeks to offer an explanation for this negative relationship
between resources and finance. It assumes that a country’s financial development
is partly shaped by the external credit demand of its industry. According to the
finance literature, sectors systematically differ in their dependence on the financial
system due to technological characteristics in the production process. In particular,
resource sectors appear to be financially independent when external dependence is
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calculated with inventories to sales, a measure that captures short-term dependence.
Thus, resource-based economies are expected to have lower (short-term) aggregate
credit demand. If short-term credit demand influenced financial development, there
would be good reason to believe that the resource curse operates through this channel.
The hypothesis is tested with an OLS regression in a cross-section of countries and in
a panel specification with time and country fixed effects that also exploits the time
variation in the variables. Furthermore, I estimate a 2SLS regression where aggre-
gate credit demand is predicted using a gravity estimation with exogenous geographic
determinants in order to overcome the endogeneity problem.
In a cross-section of 93 (110) countries with averages from 1970 to 2007 (1992 to 2007),
the external finance need of exports (EFNX), the proxy for an economy’s aggregate
credit demand, is positively related to the level of financial development. This result
is supported by the instrumentation strategy. When estimating panel specifications
with similar samples, the opposite is true. EFNX calculated with inventories to sales
appears not to be significant. The results are robust to the variation of financial
development measures, and robust to the inclusion of different control variables such
as real GDP per capita and trade openness.
Thus, in the cross-section, there is evidence for a resource curse operating via a demand-
side effect in the financial system. In contrast, the panel analysis does not support this
hypothesis. This points to important omitted variables in the cross-section. While the
consideration of a country’s institutional quality does not alter the results, external
finance need of exports is insignificant in all specifications when export concentration is
included. This contradicts the main hypothesis and indicates that export concentration
rather than credit demand of resource firms might explain the negative link between
resources and finance.
Further research on the financial channel of the resource curse should concentrate
on alternative explanations. Suggested theories such as interest groups preventing
reforms will have to be explored in more detail. Also, explanations linked to export





RZ-type Measure Inventories to Sales
(1) (2)
Tobacco Crude petroleum and natural gas
Footwear Printing and publishing
Furniture Coal mining





Paper and products Furniture
Other chemicals Paper and products
Machinery Food products
Food products Plastic products
Petroleum refineries Motor vehicles
Iron and steel Nonmetal products
Industrial chemicals Office and computing
Plastic products Other chemicals
Electric machinery Metal products
Other mining Other mining
Coal mining Nonferrous metal
Motor vehicles Rubber products
Nonferrous metal Metal ore mining
Transportation equipment Iron and steel
Nonmetal products Textile




Professional goods Transportation equipment
Crude petroleum and natural gas Petroleum and coal products
Office and computing Machinery
Metal ore mining Electric machinery
Petroleum and coal products Professional goods
Drugs Footwear
The table reports the ranking of natural resource and manufacturing sectors for both measures of financial dependence
(in ascending order). (1) The RZ-type measure is calculated as (CAPXt −OANCFt)/CAPXt, where CAPX denotes
capital expenditures and OANCF net cash flow from operative activities (in Compustat items). (2) The ratio of
inventories to sales is calculated as INV T/SALE. Sector classification is ISIC Rev. 2. See Hattendorff (2012).
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Financial Development and Resource Abundance
OLS Cross-section, Averages, 1992-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
















Resource Abundance −0.302∗∗∗ −1 ∗ 10−5∗∗ −0.260∗∗ −0.337∗∗∗ −0.532∗∗∗
(0.090) (4.3 ∗ 10−6) (0.118) (0.116) (0.162)
Other Controls Log(Income), Log(Trade Openness), Legal Origin Dummies
Constant −1.294∗∗∗ −1.495∗∗∗ −1.508∗∗∗ −0.707 0.784
(0.330) (0.349) (0.323) (0.497) (0.659)
Observations 84 84 84 71 71
R2 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.49 0.41
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Variables
are averaged over the period 1992-2007. The resource abundance measure is varied using the export share of resources
(1, 4 and 5), subsoil wealth per capita (2) and subsoil in total wealth (3). Selected measures of financial development
(FD) are private credit to GDP (1 to 3), the stock market trade value to GDP (4) and the stock market turnover
ratio (5). Log(Income) is the log of real GDP per capita, and Log(Trade Openness) is the log of total trade to





Sector-level Gravity Estimations, 1992-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sector (ISIC Rev. 2) 210 220 230 290 311 313 314 321 322
Dep. Var. Log of bilateral exports to GDP LogEXPicd
ldistcd −1.031
∗∗∗
−1.921∗∗∗ −0.865∗∗∗ −1.564∗∗∗ −1.496∗∗∗ −1.171∗∗∗ −1.452∗∗∗ −1.677∗∗∗ −1.998∗∗∗
(0.203) (0.190) (0.162) (0.077) (0.061) (0.075) (0.094) (0.057) (0.072)
lpopc −1.602
∗∗∗
−1.243∗∗∗ −0.473∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗∗ −0.217∗∗∗ −0.409∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.170) (0.118) (0.058) (0.047) (0.059) (0.083) (0.044) (0.056)
lareac 1.330
∗∗∗ 1.021∗∗∗ 0.124 −0.032 0.045 −0.238∗∗∗ 0.071 −0.318∗∗∗ −0.490∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.151) (0.141) (0.062) (0.047) (0.057) (0.077) (0.044) (0.056)
lpopd 0.613
∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗∗ 0.849∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ −0.041 0.687∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗
(0.174) (0.154) (0.123) (0.059) (0.044) (0.056) (0.073) (0.041) (0.053)
laread −0.081 0.258
∗
−0.002 0.071 0.126∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗
(0.172) (0.151) (0.117) (0.056) (0.042) (0.053) (0.071) (0.039) (0.049)
landlockedcd −0.485 −2.183
∗∗∗
−1.052∗∗ −1.133∗∗∗ −1.602∗∗∗ −0.761∗∗∗ −0.580∗∗ −1.235∗∗∗ −0.904∗∗∗
(0.892) (0.702) (0.476) (0.203) (0.140) (0.175) (0.276) (0.122) (0.160)
bordercd 8.917 17.822
∗∗∗ 3.409 −2.687 5.394∗ 6.477∗ 6.223∗ −2.598 0.287∗
(5.748) (6.278) (5.775) (3.486) (3.056) (3.598) (3.585) (2.856) (3.545)
bordercd ∗ ldistcd 0.040 0.756 −0.907 −0.052 0.924 0.583 0.344 1.247
∗∗ 0.810
(0.984) (1.258) (1.000) (0.643) (0.564) (0.662) (0.660) (0.528) (0.654)
bordercd ∗ popc 0.569 0.422 −0.059 −1.200
∗∗∗ 0.258 −0.082 0.268 −0.556 −0.701
(0.604) (0.765) (0.690) (0.428) (0.381) (0.447) (0.448) (0.356) (0.441)
bordercd ∗ areac −0.349 −1.113 0.291 1.024
∗∗
−0.794∗∗ −0.405 −0.605 −0.132 −0.105
(0.610) (0.770) (0.694) (0.433) (0.391) (0.460) (0.471) (0.366) (0.454)
bordercd ∗ popd 0.824 0.073 0.236 0.452 −0.260 0.012 −0.135 0.214 −0.232
(0.597) (0.742) (0.587) (0.372) (0.332) (0.391) (0.392) (0.311) (0.386)
bordercd ∗ aread −0.747 −0.791 −0.044 −0.522 −0.020 −0.287 −0.024 −0.074 −0.041
(0.675) (0.770) (0.613) (0.400) (0.354) (0.415) (0.423) (0.331) (0.410)
bordercd ∗ landl.cd 0.569 −0.253 0.596 1.722
∗∗ 1.350∗∗ 0.860 −0.843 1.560∗∗∗ 1.154
(1.284) (1.342) (1.126) (0.749) (0.637) (0.750) (0.773) (0.594) (0.738)
lsubsoilintotalwealthc −0.149 −0.099 −0.259
∗∗∗ 0.002 0.016 −0.160∗∗∗ −0.039 −0.049∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.076) (0.067) (0.029) (0.021) (0.027) (0.035) (0.020) (0.026)
lsubsoilintotalwealthd −0.054 −0.238
∗∗∗
−0.237∗∗∗ −0.187∗∗∗ −0.163∗∗∗ −0.207∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗ −0.199∗∗∗ −0.319∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.066) (0.054) (0.025) (0.194) (0.025) (0.032) (0.018) (0.023)
Constant −14.86∗∗∗ −8.785∗∗∗ −5.383∗∗ −0.246 −0.149 −2.044∗∗ −1.884 3.504∗∗∗ 6.079∗∗∗
(3.126) (2.701) (2.462) (1.092) (0.829) (1.022) (1.312) (0.779) (0.987)
Observations 350 631 834 1749 2403 2101 1221 2442 2286
R2 0.39 0.29 0.24 0.40 0.40 0.31 0.32 0.50 0.44
Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Variables are averaged over the
period 1992-2007. Each column shows the results of a sector-level gravity estimation. The left-hand side variable LogEXPicd denotes
the log of exports from country c to d relative to GDP in industry i. The geographical variables at the right-hand side include the
log of bilateral distance between the two countries’ major cities ldistcd, the log of country c’s population lpopc, the log of its land
area lareac and both variables for trade partner d, respectively. The dummy variable landlockedcd indicates whether none, one or
both of the countries are landlocked by taking the value of zero, one or two. bordercd is a common-border dummy. The following





Sector-level Gravity Estimations, 1992-2007
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Sector (ISIC Rev. 2) 324 331 332 341 342 351 352 3522 353
Dep. Var. Log of bilateral exports to GDP LogEXPicd
ldistcd −1.783
∗∗∗
−1.843∗∗∗ −1.527∗∗∗ −1.974∗∗∗ −1.750∗∗∗ −1.432∗∗∗ −1.610∗∗∗ −1.290∗∗∗ −1.573∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.068) (0.072) (0.064) (0.065) (0.053) (0.061) (0.065) (0.086)
lpopc 0.437
∗∗∗
−0.063 0.291∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ −0.117∗
(0.058) (0.052) (0.056) (0.049) (0.050) (0.041) (0.047) (0.050) (0.068)
lareac −0.394
∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ −0.481∗∗∗ −0.351∗∗∗ −0.400∗∗∗ −0.403∗∗∗ −0.553∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.053) (0.057) (0.048) (0.049) (0.039) (0.046) (0.052) (0.062)
lpopd 0.345
∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.846∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ 0.963∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.707∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.051) (0.055) (0.046) (0.048) (0.039) (0.045) (0.048) (0.067)
laread 0.329
∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.046 0.255∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.047) (0.052) (0.044) (0.045) (0.037) (0.042) (0.045) (0.064)
landlockedcd −1.197
∗∗∗ 1.024∗∗∗ −0.685∗∗∗ −1.016∗∗∗ −1.111∗∗∗ 1.453∗∗∗ −1.292∗∗∗ −0.752∗∗∗ −1.856∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.159) (0.168) (0.143) (0.144) (0.115) (0.134) (0.142) (0.227)
bordercd −0.163 3.672 5.390 −1.204 −4.523 −1.647 −4.488 0.086 −0.789
(3.373) (3.260) (3.337) (3.135) (3.229) (2.681) (3.061) (3.480) (3.864)
bordercd ∗ ldistcd 0.999 1.398
∗∗ 0.439 0.972∗ 0.665 0.405 0.717 0.302 −0.322
(0.616) (0.601) (0.616) (0.578) (0.596) (0.495) (0.565) (0.631) (0.712)
bordercd ∗ popc −0.290 −0.456 −0.197 −0.662
∗
−1.185∗∗∗ −0.668∗∗ −0.751∗∗ −0.123 −0.533
(0.416) (0.405) (0.418) (0.390) (0.402) (0.334) (0.381) (0.416) (0.480)
bordercd ∗ areac −0.472 −0.279 −0.502 0.303 0.753
∗ 0.372 0.256 −0.129 0.546
(0.426) (0.417) (0.428) (0.401) (0.413) (0.343) (0.392) (0.433) (0.480)
bordercd ∗ popd −0.710
∗∗
−0.060 −0.461 −0.116 0.209 −0.295 −0.277 −0.577 0.266
(0.363) (0.354) (0.370) (0.341) (0.351) (0.292) (0.333) (0.415) (0.415)
bordercd ∗ aread 0.334 −0.533 0.098 −0.494 −0.406 −0.138 0.058 0.187 −0.193
(0.385) (0.377) (0.391) (0.363) (0.374) (0.310) (0.354) (0.392) (0.447)
bordercd ∗ landl.cd 1.499
∗∗ 0.911 1.479∗∗ 1.421∗∗ 1.628∗∗ 1.628∗∗∗ 1.549∗∗ 0.818 2.119∗∗∗
(0.696) (0.680) (0.696) (0.653) (0.672) (0.557) (0.637) (0.682) (0.794)
lsubsoilintotalwealthc −0.010 0.111
∗∗∗ 0.048∗ −0.152∗∗∗ −0.264 0.037∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.013 0.186∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.024) (0.027) (0.022) (0.023) (0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.028)
lsubsoilintotalwealthd −0.240
∗∗∗
−0.225∗∗∗ −0.234∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗ −0.182∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.158∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.029)
Constant 3.776∗∗∗ 0.471 −2.206∗∗ 2.192∗∗ 2.208∗∗ 3.703∗∗∗ 4.689∗∗∗ 2.967∗∗∗ 5.415∗∗∗
(1.034) (0.933) (1.006) (0.866) (0.887) (0.718) (0.829) (0.918) (1.168)
Observations 1853 2173 1967 2304 2339 2477 2384 2145 1643
R2 0.41 0.44 0.35 0.49 0.46 0.56 0.48 0.39 0.44
Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Variables are averaged over the
period 1992-2007. Each column shows the results of a sector-level gravity estimation. The left-hand side variable LogEXPicd denotes
the log of exports from country c to d relative to GDP in industry i. The geographical variables at the right-hand side include the
log of bilateral distance between the two countries’ major cities ldistcd, the log of country c’s population lpopc, the log of its land
area lareac and both variables for trade partner d, respectively. The dummy variable landlockedcd indicates whether none, one or
both of the countries are landlocked by taking the value of zero, one or two. bordercd is a common-border dummy. The following





Sector-level Gravity Estimations, 1992-2007
(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
Sector (ISIC Rev. 2) 354 355 356a 369 371 372 381 382 3825
Dep. Var. Log of bilateral exports to GDP LogEXPicd
ldistcd −0.436
∗∗∗
−1.489∗∗∗ −1.617∗∗∗ −1.688∗∗∗ −1.571∗∗∗ −1.786∗∗∗ −1.364∗∗∗ −1.545∗∗∗
(0.167) (0.060) (0.063) (0.062) (0.074) (0.058) (0.051) (0.066)
lpopc −0.981
∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗ 0.013 −0.242∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ −0.165∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.045) (0.049) (0.048) (0.057) (0.045) (0.039) (0.049)
lareac 0.249
∗
−0.463∗∗∗ −0.237∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗ 0.037 −0.357∗∗∗ −0.170∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.045) (0.049) (0.046) (0.059) (0.044) (0.038) (0.050)
lpopd 0.168 0.461
∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗ 1.042∗∗∗ 0.593∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.044) (0.046) (0.045) (0.055) (0.042) (0.036) (0.048)
laread 0.178 0.305
∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.092∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.041) (0.044) (0.042) (0.052) (0.040) (0.035) (0.046)
landlockedcd −1.527
∗∗
−1.099∗∗∗ −0.978∗∗∗ −2.123∗∗∗ −1.461∗∗∗ −1.538∗∗∗ −1.418∗∗∗ −0.865∗∗∗
(0.660) (0.132) (0.144) (0.140) (0.174) (0.126) (0.109) (0.141)
bordercd 0.849 −2.089 −0.596 −1.343 2.683 −3.964 −2.308 1.926
(5.047) (2.904) (3.030) (3.052) (3.508) (2.961) (2.614) (3.209)
bordercd ∗ ldistcd −1.500 0.670 1.139
∗∗ 0.637 0.934 0.954∗ 0.939∗ 0.714
(0.957) (0.551) (0.559) (0.563) (0.646) (0.547) (0.483) (0.613)
bordercd ∗ popc 0.720 −0.752
∗∗
−0.490 −0.716∗ −0.605 −0.826∗∗ −0.471 −0.409
(0.604) (0.363) (0.377) (0.380) (0.436) (0.369) (0.326) (0.401)
bordercd ∗ areac −0.190 0.186 −0.101 0.134 −0.150 0.241 0.016 −0.283
(0.635) (0.382) (0.387) (0.391) (0.448) (0.379) (0.335) (0.425)
bordercd ∗ popd 0.007 −0.100 −0.327 −0.119 0.043 −0.263 −0.387 −0.084
(0.600) (0.320) (0.329) (0.332) (0.381) (0.322) (0.285) (0.355)
bordercd ∗ aread 0.729 −0.070 −0.156 −0.101 −0.302 −0.103 −0.058 −0.059
(0.601) (0.346) (0.350) (0.353) (0.405) (0.343) (0.303) (0.384)
bordercd ∗ landl.cd 1.902
∗ 1.337∗∗ 1.330∗∗ 2.362∗∗∗ 1.236∗ 1.849∗∗∗ 1.756∗∗∗ 1.347∗∗
(1.151) (0.604) (0.632) (0.636) (0.732) (0.616) (0.543) (0.667)
lsubsoilintotalwealthc 0.245
∗∗∗
−0.126∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗ −0.022 0.052∗ 0.040∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗ −0.009
(0.062) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.028) (0.020) (0.017) (0.024)
lsubsoilintotalwealthd −0.104
∗
−0.133∗∗∗ −0.158∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗ −0.256∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.019) (0.016) (0.021)
Constant −6.939∗∗∗ 2.405∗∗∗ −0.128 3.182∗∗∗ 0.126 5.460∗∗∗ 0.085 2.912∗∗∗
(2.381) (0.808) (0.863) (0.837) (1.049) (0.792) (0.689) (0.898)
Observations 612 2217 2183 2303 2172 2466 2542 2201
R2 0.19 0.46 0.42 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.46
Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Variables are averaged over the
period 1992-2007. Each column shows the results of a sector-level gravity estimation. The left-hand side variable LogEXPicd denotes
the log of exports from country c to d relative to GDP in industry i. The geographical variables at the right-hand side include the
log of bilateral distance between the two countries’ major cities ldistcd, the log of country c’s population lpopc, the log of its land
area lareac and both variables for trade partner d, respectively. The dummy variable landlockedcd indicates whether none, one or
both of the countries are landlocked by taking the value of zero, one or two. bordercd is a common-border dummy. The following
variables are interaction terms with bordercd. lsubsoilintotalwealth is the log of subsoil wealth in total wealth for both the exporter
and importer. a The plastic products sector (356) must be dropped due to inconsistencies in the matching of sector classifications




Sector-level Gravity Estimations, 1992-2007
(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33)
Sector (ISIC Rev. 2) 383 3832 384 3843 385 390
Dep. Var. Log of bilateral exports to GDP LogEXPicd
ldistcd −1.557
∗∗∗
−1.511∗∗∗ −1.232∗∗∗ −1.524∗∗∗ −1.252∗∗∗ −1.480∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.067) (0.071) (0.060) (0.061) (0.066)
lpopc 0.188
∗∗∗
−0.107∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.086∗ 0.302∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.051) (0.054) (0.046) (0.046) (0.051)
lareac −0.165
∗∗∗
−0.183∗∗∗ −0.266∗∗∗ −0.397∗∗∗ −0.073 −0.407∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.051) (0.053) (0.046) (0.048) (0.051)
lpopd 0.848
∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.049) (0.052) (0.044) (0.044) (0.049)
laread 0.091
∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.047) (0.050) (0.042) (0.042) (0.046)
landlockedcd −1.182
∗∗∗
−1.355∗∗∗ −0.653∗∗∗ −1.206∗∗∗ −1.101∗∗∗ −1.323∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.145) (0.163) (0.132) (0.132) (0.149)
bordercd −4.490 −1.379 −0.373 −1.371 −2.089 −0.524
(2.929) (3.326) (3.445) (2.987) (3.040) (3.302)
bordercd ∗ ldistcd 0.810 0.890 0.136 −1.051
∗ 0.821 0.686
(0.541) (0.614) (0.635) (0.551) (0.561) (0.610)
bordercd ∗ popc −0.664
∗
−0.385 −0.874∗∗ −0.898∗∗ −0.537 −0.409
(0.365) (0.414) (0.429) (0.372) (0.379) (0.411)
bordercd ∗ areac 0.199 −0.142 0.467 −0.009 0.041 −0.061
(0.375) (0.426) (0.441) (0.382) (0.389) (0.423)
bordercd ∗ popd −0.368 −0.072 0.235 −0.055 −0.294 −0.360
(0.319) (0.362) (0.375) (0.325) (0.331) (0.359)
bordercd ∗ aread 0.026 −0.053 −0.281 −0.103 −0.026 0.013
(0.339) (0.385) (0.398) (0.346) (0.352) (0.382)
bordercd ∗ landl.cd 1.581
∗∗∗ 1.392∗∗ 1.433∗∗ 1.003 1.656∗∗∗ 1.462∗∗
(0.609) (0.691) (0.718) (0.621) (0.632) (0.688)
lsubsoilintotalwealthc −0.198
∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.047∗ −0.128∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.040∗
(0.020) (0.024) (0.025) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024)
lsubsoilintotalwealthd 0.116
∗∗∗
−0.189∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗∗ −0.161∗∗∗ −0.147∗∗∗ −0.214∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
Constant 2.011∗∗ 2.219∗∗ 0.763 2.719∗∗∗ −1.717∗∗ 2.707∗∗∗
(0.789) (0.920) (0.959) (0.822) (0.855) (0.909)
Observations 2437 2294 2207 2324 2371 2355
R2 0.49 0.42 0.33 0.46 0.42 0.42
Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Variables are averaged over the
period 1992-2007. Each column shows the results of a sector-level gravity estimation. The left-hand side variable LogEXPicd denotes
the log of exports from country c to d relative to GDP in industry i. The geographical variables at the right-hand side include the
log of bilateral distance between the two countries’ major cities ldistcd, the log of country c’s population lpopc, the log of its land
area lareac and both variables for trade partner d, respectively. The dummy variable landlockedcd indicates whether none, one or
both of the countries are landlocked by taking the value of zero, one or two. bordercd is a common-border dummy. The following






Algeria Egypt Kenya Rwanda
Argentina El Salvador Republic of Korea (IV) Saudi Arabia
Australia (IV) Ethiopia Kuwait Senegal
Austria (IV) Finland (IV) Madagascar Sierra Leone
Bahrain France (IV) Malawi Singapore
Bangladesh Gabon Malaysia South Africa (IV)
Belgium and Lux. (IV) Gambia Mexico (IV) Spain (IV)
Bolivia Germany (IV) Morocco Sri Lanka
Brazil (IV) Ghana Nepal Sudan
Burkina Faso Greece (IV) Netherlands (IV) Sweden (IV)
Burundi Guatemala New Zealand Switzerland and Liecht.
Cameroon Haiti Nicaraguaa Syria
Canada Honduras Niger Thailand
Central African Rep. Hungary Nigeria Togo
Chile Iceland Norway (IV) Trinidad and Tob. (IV)
Chinaa India (IV) Pakistan Tunisia
China (Hongkong) Indonesia Panama Turkey (IV)
Colombia Iran (IV) Papua New Guinea United Kingdom (IV)
Congo Ireland (IV) Paraguay United States
Costa Rica Israel Peru (IV) Uganda
Coˆte d’Ivoire Italy (IV) Philippines Uruguay
Denmark (IV) Jamaica Poland Venezuela
Dominican Republic Japan (IV) Portugal (IV) Zambia
Ecuador (IV) Jordan Romania (IV) Zimbabwea
Sample 1992-2007, Additional Countries
Albania Estonia (IV) Latvia Russia (IV)
Armenia Georgia (IV) Lithuania Slovakia
Bulgaria (IV) Hungary (IV) TFYR Macedonia Slovenia
Czech Republic Kazakhstan Republic of Moldova
Croatia Kyrgyzstan Mongolia
The exact number of countries included in the regressions depends on the data available and may vary. (IV) indicates
that the country is included in the instrumentation strategy, which focuses on the time period 1992-2007. a Not included
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